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https://github.com/SoftEtherVPN/SoftEtherVPN.git
synced 2024-11-09 19:20:41 +03:00
Fixed the vulnerability that a malformed packet will cause the buffer overflow at the receive path. This vulnerability may occur abnormal process exit with the buffer security check mechanism built-in with SoftEther VPN binary. Although this buffer overflow can theoretically bypass the security check in theory, in the actual binary it is detected by the buffer security check inserted by the C compiler and the process is forcibly terminated. Therefore, as a result, it can be abused by a DoS attacker. Acknowledgments: The last problems is discovered and reported by Fabrizio Steiner.
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@ -2197,7 +2197,9 @@ bool RsaVerify(void *data, UINT data_size, void *sign, K *k)
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bool RsaVerifyEx(void *data, UINT data_size, void *sign, K *k, UINT bits)
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bool RsaVerifyEx(void *data, UINT data_size, void *sign, K *k, UINT bits)
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{
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{
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UCHAR hash_data[SIGN_HASH_SIZE];
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UCHAR hash_data[SIGN_HASH_SIZE];
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UCHAR decrypt_data[SIGN_HASH_SIZE];
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UCHAR *decrypt_data;
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RSA *rsa;
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UINT rsa_size;
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// Validate arguments
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// Validate arguments
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if (data == NULL || sign == NULL || k == NULL || k->private_key != false)
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if (data == NULL || sign == NULL || k == NULL || k->private_key != false)
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{
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{
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@ -2208,24 +2210,38 @@ bool RsaVerifyEx(void *data, UINT data_size, void *sign, K *k, UINT bits)
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bits = RSA_KEY_SIZE;
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bits = RSA_KEY_SIZE;
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}
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}
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rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(k->pkey);
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if (rsa == NULL)
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{
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return false;
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}
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// Hash the data
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// Hash the data
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if (HashForSign(hash_data, sizeof(hash_data), data, data_size) == false)
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if (HashForSign(hash_data, sizeof(hash_data), data, data_size) == false)
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{
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{
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return false;
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return false;
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}
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}
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rsa_size = RSA_size(rsa);
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rsa_size = MAX(rsa_size, 1024); // For just in case
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decrypt_data = ZeroMalloc(rsa_size);
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// Decode the signature
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// Decode the signature
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if (RSA_public_decrypt(bits / 8, sign, decrypt_data, EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(k->pkey), RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) <= 0)
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if (RSA_public_decrypt(bits / 8, sign, decrypt_data, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) <= 0)
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{
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{
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Free(decrypt_data);
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return false;
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return false;
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}
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}
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// Comparison
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// Comparison
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if (Cmp(decrypt_data, hash_data, SIGN_HASH_SIZE) != 0)
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if (Cmp(decrypt_data, hash_data, SIGN_HASH_SIZE) != 0)
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{
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{
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Free(decrypt_data);
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return false;
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return false;
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}
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}
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Free(decrypt_data);
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return true;
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return true;
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}
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}
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