Preventing the Win32 API LoadLibrary() current directory DLL injection issue.

When loading the DLL file by the LoadLibrary() function in Windows VPN programs, we changed the behavior not to search the current directory. Based on this improvement, even if there are untrusted DLL files in the calendar directory, it is now safe to avoid the problem of unexpected security problem caused by the default loading behavior of Windows. Acknowledgments: This is based on a report by Herman Groeneveld, aka Sh4d0wman.
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Daiyuu Nobori committed 2018-04-22 18:35:38 +09:00
1 parent b1f74268b1
commit 241813e827
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@@ -134,6 +134,8 @@
// WinMain function
int PASCAL WinMain(HINSTANCE hInst, HINSTANCE hPrev, char *CmdLine, int CmdShow)
{
InitProcessCallOnce();
InitMayaqua(false, false, 0, NULL);
InitCedar();